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Abstract— Business models involving buyers of digital goods
in the distribution process are called superdistribution schemes.
We review the state-of-the art of research and application of
superdistribution and propose systematic approach to market
mechanisms using super-distribution and technical system archi-
tectures supporting it. The limiting conditions on such markets
are of economic, legal, technical, and psychological nature.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information systems in general and the distribution of digital
content in particular are dominated by centralised structures
rooted in client-server models, and large efforts have been
made for the vertical integration of content production, inges-
tion, and distribution [1]. The final transportation of content
to the head-ends is nowadays either digital broadcast, e.g.,
DVB [2], multicast, as for instance envisioned in 3GPP Long-
Term Evolution [3], or content push [4].
Peer-to-peer (p2p) systems on the other hand realise a
completely different paradigm for data transport in networks,
namely distribution from nodes to other nodes with little
involvement of central instances [5]. File-sharing networks like
KaZaA or Gnutella embody this paradigm on the application
level, implementing overlay networks in which users actively
(with varied degrees of automation) re- or superdistribute
content, in the form of digital files, to other users.
The term superdistribution may have been coined in [6],
[7], in any case it hase been around in information and
communication research for some time. Though the concept
lay dormant for quite a while — perhaps due to the association
with the dominant use of p2p and file sharing by free riders
and the copyright wars — interest in superdistribution has
been rekindled recently in the content producing industry.
The combined size of the most important existing businesses
based on content superdistribution schemes are of a small
scale in comparison to the turnovers of the media industry
as a whole. Nevertheless they prove that the industry is
seriously experimenting with the concept. Most importantly,
superdistribution has even been cast in the form of a standard
for the mobile domain by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA).
Technically, superdistribution has hitherto been viewed just
as a variant of Digital Rights Management (DRM) [8], [9],
or of p2p systems, and research on its fundamentals is still
scarce. For instance, basic economic questions pertaining to
the viability of superdistribution in particular in competition
with free riders have only been examined in our previous
work [10]. The present paper presents a first contribution to
a treatment of other characteristic issues of superdistribution
systems, viewed as information systems in their application
and economic context. A system model for generic superdis-
tribution is proposed in Section II, while Section III presents
two concrete realisations with distinct traits. Section IV is
the core part of the paper which collects the (in our view)
most important research topics on superdistribution and tries
to give an overview over the current state of knowledge in
the area. The overarching theme here is the technological and
economic viability of such systems. Section V tries to put
superdistribution into the context of current socio-economic
developments surrounding content distribution, copyright pro-
tection, and piracy, in front of their historic background. We
conclude in Section VI.
II. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SUPERDISTRIBUTION
NETWORKS
Superdistribution is the combined distribution and market
scheme for digital goods involving buyers in the distribution
process in such a way that they redistribute the good to other
legitimate buyers. Here a digital good is an information good
in the economical sense [11], [12], which is represented in
digital form, regardless of being embodied physically or only
in intangible form (some use the term virtual goods, coined
by [13] and used for for information goods in intangible, digi-
tal form, and distributed via electronic networks). In an active
sense, to superdistribute means the combined transaction of
acquiring a good and its (offering for) re-distribution, or resale,
and actually transferring it to another node.
Here we argue that existing system models for DRM are to
narrow to accommodate for the specific features and structures
of superdistribution. In fact, extending DRM into various
directions is a recent research trend, which is triggered by the
manifold ways in which users operate with digital goods for
instance in social networks. For instance, the authors of [14]
transcend DRM by envisioning a system in which only the
information on “who owns this digital good” is managed and
thus agents in the economic network can be given ample
freedom, e.g., to superdistribute it. In this section, we present
a similar approach to extend information management systems
in an appropriate way for superdistribution.
A. Superdistribution networks
A superdistribution network in the most general sense
has two sides. The first one is the network over which
the good is distributed, economically a logistics network for
the final distribution of the good to the consumer. If it is
an electronic network, it is a particular kind of a content
distribution network, like Akamai, Amazon S3, Corel, CD-
Networks, etc. Whether a good is distributed by ordinary mail,
over an electronic network, or by short-range communication
between mobile devices, is immaterial for the classification
as a superdistribution network. Paradigm examples exist for
all three variants: The classic chain latter in the first, peer-
to-peer networks in the second, and superdistribution between
mobile devices as for instance standardised by OMA in the
last case. In all cases, superdistribution is an overlay over
an (often general-purpose) communication or transportation
network, like ordinary mail, the Internet, or Bluetooth ad
hoc communication between mobile devices. We call this
side of a superdistribution network the content distribution
overlay (CDO). The CDO is a directed graph, which in most
(reasonable) cases may be assumed to be a connected tree.
The CDO graph can be coloured, i.e., various attributes may
be attached to the edges, a particular example being that
the quality of the good may change, e.g., improved by a
superdistributing node to compete with other resellers.
Fig. 1. Superdistribution overlay networks in the system context.
Superdistributing nodes in a CDO need a good, economic
reason to participate. This is always true due to the minimum
marginal cost greater than zero incurred by a superdistributing
node for storage and transferal of the good to and from
him-/herself (one of the two at least is borne by a specific
node). That is, nodes expect some kind of remuneration for
participating actively in the CDO — otherwise they may just
become sinks for the digital good. The flow of remunera-
tion — pecuniary, informational, immaterial, or of any other
conceivable kind — constitutes another overlay network, the
remuneration overlay network (RON). The claim here is that
no superdistribution network exists without RON, the most
trivial example being the tree spanned by the resale prices
paid by buyers to superdistributing nodes in the CDO. In this
case the edges of the RON are just the edges of the CDO
with inverted directions (and different colours, e.g., the sales
price, attached). The node-set of the RON can be assumed to
be a subset of the node-set of the CDO, but the relation of the
RON’s edges to the edges of the CDO is generally nontrivial.
For instance in multi-level marketing, a buyer of a good might
pay a reward to resellers further down the line, and not only
the resales price to his direct reseller. Figure 1 shows CDO
and RON in the context of underlying communication and
payment networks.
B. Digital goods
The term digital good used so far refers to the economical
atom distributed over the CDO and being the root cause for
the RON. Informationally, the digital good is a compound
minimally consisting of three components.
The content is the piece of digital information that is
actually used and, if the node chooses to do so, offered
for distribution to others. As the superdistribution network
is an economic market mechanism, the content is necessarily
accompanied by information representing the contractual rules
of a) the global superdistribution market, and b) the particular
relationship between superdistributing (reseller) and acquiring
(buyer) node. Though we will not make use of this distinction
of local and global contract, this orthogonal categorisation may
be useful, e.g., to classify superdistribution networks.
Using the good means, on the one hand, that the content
is consumed by a node who acquires it. Consumption of the
content represents one part of the value proposition that the
digital good represents to a buyer. It is governed by a piece
of information commonly called the consumption licence,
which describes the conditions and permissions under which
the buyer can use the content. Economically speaking, the
consumption licence prescribes the ways in which a buyer
may turn the value proposition of the content into utility. The
consumption licence is also thought to be the informational
link between the digital good and the remuneration overlay
by stating the rules of payment for the good to the superdis-
tributing node, as well as any other reward to be paid to
further nodes or entities. In this way the consumption licence
generates the RON from the CDO, assuming the rules are
adhered to by all participants. Summarising, the consumption
licence consists of three parts:
• Consumption rules describe how content may be used;
• Remuneration rules describe how and who must be paid
for it;
• The Content association describes to which content the
rules apply.
The second way in which an acquiring node can make use
of the good is by superdistribution. We think of it as governed
by rules incorporated in a second licence, the redistribution
licence. Just as the consumption licence connects the good to
the RON, the redistribution licence conditions, or generates
the content distribution overlay. Thus, this licence consists of
two essential parts:
• Redistribution rules describe how, to whom and under
which conditions content may be redistributed;
• The Content association describes to which content the
rules apply.
The complete informational structure and its relation to CDO
and RON is visualised in Figure 2
Fig. 2. Information model of superdistribution.
Of course, many other groupings of the information char-
acterising a superdistribution network are possible — the
approach chosen here is lead by the distinction between
CDO and RON. It should also be noted that all notions
introduced above are understood here in the broadest possible
sense. That is large parts of the rules and licences may be
represented differently than in digital form and may include for
instance general legislation, copyright law, social norms, etc.
Redistribution in particular can also be governed by technical
conditions, e.g., the information system that represents the
platform for the execution of superdistribution.
Thus the particular rules that need to be represented digitally
in a concrete superdistribution network may be restrictions as
well as extensions of such global, or external, rules. Likewise,
content associations may be simple titles, digital identifiers
denoting a single piece of content or a group, or be augmented
by information protecting the integrity of digital content such
as hash values or signatures. Nothing restricts the methods by
which the licences and the content are generated, stored, and
transferred in the superdistribution network. This conceptual
approach is well known from general DRM [8].
C. Examples
Some more concrete examples might elucidate the abstract
notions of Section II-B. The most direct form of remuneration
is a resale price paid by the acquiring node to the superdis-
tributing node. This makes the superdistribution network a
genuine network market of buyers/resellers, where an incentive
to buy a good accrues to them by the resale revenues they can
achieve. The “multi” in the term multi-level marketing often
refers to the fact that many subsequent levels or generations of
buyers contribute to a node’s resales revenues, or even all of
them. This kind of payments or remunerations from the down-
line may be restricted to a finite number of buyer generations
or not, the latter case being realised in some network marketing
schemes for physical goods.
The remunerations may be conditioned by various global
or individual factors such as time, buyer/reseller location,
distance in a social network, or externalities like a measured
popularity of the content. In many cases it makes sense to let a
part of the resales price accrue to a central entity external to the
CDO proper, which we call collector. Its role may be to skim
revenues from the market for, e.g., the artists and or labels, or it
may act as a (state) collecting agency implementing a taxation
on the distribution of digital goods. Examples for second-level
payments and the role of the collector are shown in Figure 1.
An interesting example for restrictions on the redistribution
is the implementation of territorial protection of some sort.
This can be used to protect resellers from the competition of
their (direct) buyers to a certain extent buy stating, e.g., “do
not superdistribute before moving away by 100 metres”. Thus,
this kind of redistribution rule using restrictions based on ge-
ographical location may make particular sense for CDO based
short-range communication between mobile users, i.e., mobile
superdistribution. We showed in [15] how such conditions can
be enforced in an efficient, de-central, yet secure manner.
III. SOME EXAMPLES
As said, superdistribution networks occupy only a small
niche even of the online content distribution market. The better
known examples are the following. Snocap [16], founded by
one of the fathers of Napster, was started with the idea to
obtain licences from the music industry which explicitly allow
to distribute content over the existing, popular p2p networks.
Snocap uses audio fingerprinting to track the distribution
of content, and file-sharing networks need to be adapted to
support Snocap’s remuneration scheme. Though SnoCap has
made some deals with many, even major, labels, it never
took off economically and the company has been aqcuired in
February 2008 by the social networking platform imeem [17].
After restructuring and changing the strategy, Snocap has
become a general service provider for online music distribution
and for instance provides the technology for the music stores
in MySpace. MashBoxx [18] started with similar ambitions
and also close to the circles of Napster and Grokster. The
company seems lay dormant for some time, appearing in
the news only for recent intellectual property litigations [19].
Peer Impact is a pay-for-download file-sharing service created
by Wurld Media, and now acquired together with its parent
company by the online video service provider Roo [20]. The
file-sharing client has now been re-released under the new
brand name ToPeer [21] , which seems to use part of the
original technology to allow p2p users to create private spaces
in which to share content with peers they trust. In the following
we describe two particular examples in more detail. They are
chosen because they represent true technical superdistribution
systems, and their systems are better documented. The two
systems represent to some extent oppostite extremes for su-
perdistribution with respect to (de-)centralisation.
A. Potato System
The Potato system [22] is a product developed by the
4FO AG [23] (founded in 2000) together with the Fraunhofer
Institute for Digital Media Technology IDMT [24] in Ilmenau,
Germany, for superdistribution of music as mp3-files. The
technical platform for superdistribution presented by the Potato
system is centralised, insofar as it uses a central accounting
service (AS) for registration and publishing new songs by
originators, and to operate the remuneration scheme. The
content CDO is completely free of any DRM measure, the only
information protected by the AS (besides the content integrity
of which is proved by a hash value) is the redistribution
licence, which is obtained by a buyer upon payment in the
form of a transaction number (TAN). The TAN serves as a
receipt which is simply added to the file name, which is in
turn announced in subsequent resales to the AS which initiates
the rewarding of resellers. Some details are found in [25],
[26]. Potato supports various payment providers from which
the originators of a good may choose.
Fig. 3. Revenue sharing in the Potato system.
The market mechanism and remuneration scheme imple-
mented in the Potato system is perhaps the most evolved
in superdistribution. The sharing of revenues is shown in
Figure 3. Potato targets small labels and independent artists,
who may obtain 55–70% of the purchase price of every resale,
depending on the service level they choose. An interesting
detail is that Potato has an agreement with the German
collecting society for music, GEMA which obtains the due
contributions directly from the system. Potato itself and the
payment provider share 14% of the purchase price and further
14% are distributed as resale revenues from the buyer to
resellers (this share has been decreased from 35% in “Version
1.0” to the current “Version 2.0” value). The special kind of
remuneration for resellers in this system establishes a true
multi-level market with three rewarding levels, each being
awarded a geometrically decreasing share of 10, 3, and 1%,
respectively, cf. [10, Section II.B]. Thus the CDO and RON
look locally as shown in Figure 4 It is interesting to note that a
rebate of 2% (borne by the system, not the resellers) is offered
for nodes who choose to buy from a peer rather than the central
service. This an important incentive that reduces the dominant
role of a single market participant, cf. Section IV-B1.
Originally resellers were mostly left to their own devices
in marketing songs for resale. They could use a resale link
containing their TAN on their Web-site or in e-mails. The
1The present author takes the liberty to claim certain credit for suggesting
some of these novel concepts.
Fig. 4. CDO and RON of Potato connect 4 buyer generations.
most recent developments of the Potato as a superdistribution
platform regard capabilities to support users in marketing
goods, i.e., means to offer them successfully online for
superdistribution, and to compete with other resellers. This
includes the extension of resale links to Widgets embodying
small online shops where resellers can display their favourites,
covers, and let peers listen to clippings of songs. 4FO also
added a social commerce platform SpreadBox [27] to its
portfolio which also tries to leverage community aspects of
marketing in the form of product recommendation.
B. DRM Paradiso
The Paradiso system [28] is a technological solution to
DRM-based superdistribution proposed by Nair Srijith from
the research group of Andrew Tannenbaum [29], and others. Its
central technical trait is that it relies on a trusted platform [30]
to ensure adherence to consumption and redistribution licence.
Thus it makes some requirements on compliant devices with
regard to cryptographic capabilities (hash, AES engine, and
PKI management), secure storage, and secure content decoder.
In the content distribution scheme of Paradiso, consumption
and remuneration licences are cryptographically bound to the
content and chained. That is, a buyer receives with the content
a signed container from the reseller, containing all previous
licences created in every resale upstream in the CDO. The
signature also associates this data to the content. This enables
him, e.g., to verify that the content has not been tampered
with, for instance it prevents content masquerading attacks by
which a reseller might try to superdistribute content of lower
quality. The compliant device can also check that all licence
rules have been enforced in all previous distribution steps,
and enforces the applicable rules for itself, e.g., respects and
updates the allowed number of resales. Payment is and out-
of band process in Paradiso which is based on a receipt the
acquiring node sends back to the superdistributing node. It is
not hard to see that this system has strong security with respect
to the maintenance of DRM of the content as it is distributed
down the CDO. Formal security proofs are given in [31].
This system provides the strongest possible DRM enforce-
ment in superdistribution which can be implemented in a
completely decentralised fashion. The system has not been
deployed commercially, yet a prototype has been shown on
a Neuros development board [32] with similar capabilities
of what is typical for mobile music players (TI 200-MHz
ARM926, 120-MHz C54x DSP processor, 64 Mbytes of
SDRAM and 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port, etc.). The board runs
a modified version of the Linux 2.6 kernel. Based on OpenSSL
libraries for cryptographic support, the higher cryptographic
and security functions, are emulated by a software layer.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR VIABLE SUPERDISTRIBUTION
At first sight, superdistribution seems a variant of DRM or
p2p, or a combination of both. Now we try to elaborate on
specific traits to show how superdistribution is different.
A. The axis of lawfulness and legitimacy
The RON, if effective, turns superdistribution into a network
marketing scheme, or if multiple buyer generations receive
remunerations, a multi-level marketing scheme. Multi-level
marketing carries negative connotations and is illegal in special
forms known as pyramid selling, snowball systems, chain-
letters, etc., under many jurisdictions. This similarity to illicit
schemes has perhaps also impeded applied research in the
field of superdistribution as such. [33, Vol. II] present criteria
to distinguish between legitimate multi-level marketing and
such practises that are to be considered illicit. In the case of
digital goods some arguments speak for the viability of fair
superdistribution schemes (thoroughly discussed in [34], [35]).
i) Buyers acquire not only a void right to resale, but also a good
of value. Potential losses an agent entering at a late stage will
incur are charged up against this value; ii) Inventory loading,
i.e., the obligation to keep a large, non-returnable stock, is
irrelevant for digital goods; iii) Marginal costs for replication
and redistribution are mostly much smaller than resale prices
and thus transaction costs are largely insignificant; iv) A main
novel feature of the concepts above is that they enable in
principle a fair system design (see below).
Other legal requirements for superdistribution are derived
from the corresponding ones for general electronic commerce.
i) privacy of buyers and sellers should be maintained by
implementing minimal-need-to-know principles; ii) Consumer
protection legislation, as, e.g., in the EU [36], needs to be
respected; iii) Copyright law must be respected, i.e., origi-
nators rights must be properly transcribed into the licences
and a system’s operator must obtain all necessary rights and
involve collecting societies, etc. iv) Contracts between buyers
and resellers must be enforceable and individual fraud (e.g.,
by selling content of lower value than proposed) must be
prevented; v) Market abuse and distortion must be prevented,
cf. the economical and security requirements below.
B. The economical axis
Digital goods share the properties of information goods
which are transferable and non-rival like public goods, and
additionally are durable, i.e., show no wear out by usage or
time [11], [12]. Like for a private good, however, original
creation can be costly, whereas reproduction and redistribution
are potentially very cheap. This is the economical basis for
superdistribution which emulates the distribution system of
free-riders, namely p2p networks [37]. They pose additional
value proposition to buyers of the original (legal) version of
the good by revenues or other rewards linked to resales. Thus
the central question for superdistribution of digital goods is
economic viability in the presence of free-riders.
The RON of a superdistribution network is a network
marketing scheme. Theoretical treatments for network markets
are scarce, which inspired us to devise a stochastic model for
the dynamics of such markets in [34] and evaluate it in various
ways [10], [35]. The model is essentially comprised of atomic
agents entering the market continuously until saturation, with
equal chance to trade with each other, i.e., to buy the good
from a reseller. With these assumptions, a node entering the
CDO at a certain point in time, i.e., a certain market saturation,
can calculate its expected revenues from subsequent resales,
given that the price schedule of current and future resales
prices is known. Figure 5 shows two examples (black, blue)
of prices (dashed), expected resales revenues (thin solid) and
effective prices, i.e., price paid minus expected revenues (thick
solid), plotted against the saturation parameter running from
0 to 1. The thrilling flip side of the innocuous mathematical
expressions defining this model is that it enables dynamical
forward pricing. That is, the operator of a superdistribution
network can in principle control the incentive that accrues to
buyers via the resales revenues over time. This possibility has
not been exploited by any superdistribution schemes yet.
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Fig. 5. Examples for expected revenues from resales and effective price in
random superdistribution with dynamical forward pricing.
Further results model’s analysis spark optimism for su-
perdistribution as a business and its viability as a replacement
for DRM. In a basic extension of the model it was shown
in [10] that the legitimate good in the CDO can prevail against
a free-rider version under moderate assumptions. Nonetheless,
superdistribution market mechanisms need to be carefully
crafted as many more external factors other than rational
decision-making based on pecuniary incentives come into play.
One important aspect in that vein is market homogeneity.
While superdistribution will work fine in a population which
consists of a rather homogeneous group of individuals, for
instance with special preferences, it may break down if the
market is biased in the sense that there is a group of agents
with higher trading capacities, e.g., large music labels running
direct sale web sites. Furthermore, inhomogeneities amplified
by network effects [38]–[42] carry the imminent danger that
the market can be cannibalised at an early stage by an agent
with overwhelmingly high communication capacity, e.g., a
popular web site, who could then obtain a practical monopoly.
Finally, there is a psychological element to superdistribution
that is connected to the aleatory element of network markets
and human sense of justice, which modern empirical eco-
nomics has shown to be an important driving force of human
action [43]. In the small-scale study on a real superdistribution
system [44], it was shown that users felt bad about the
monetary incentive they received from resales since they
were asking money from their peers for something that was
perceived as pure entertainment. Though these results may be
culture-dependent to some extent, they show that the marketing
aspects of superdistribution deserve utmost care.
C. The security and technical axis
From a security viewpoint the central difference between
DRM and superdistribution is that DRM protection is focused
entirely on the CDO, while in superdistribution the most
important protection goals regard the remuneration. In fact, the
parts of superdistribution which require local DRM protection
in and between the nodes are encoded in the consumption
rules of the consumption licence and the redistribution rules.
The latter are essential to protect the business model and
market mechanism implemented by the superdistribution sys-
tem’s operator. These CDO protection requirements can be
implemented by arbitrary DRM measures, centralised or de-
centralised and with a varied level of enforcement, as we
have seen in the examples of Section III. An important point
for the buyer is the secure association to the content to
prevent the mentioned content masquerading. On the other
hand, ensuring remuneration is essential to implement a fair
superdistribution market. A natural way to combine the in-
band with the necessary out-of-band processes, e.g., payment,
is by sending back receipts, which are cryptographically bound
to the content and transaction, to the reseller. The reseller can
then for instance redeem these receipts as tickets at a central
rewarding service. We have shown a way to implement such
general schemes with trusted platforms in [45].
Privacy is of utmost importance in a network of transactions
involving a large number of partners. In superdistribution pri-
vacy is limited again essentially in the remuneration process,
since there buyer and reseller need to reveal their identities
and transaction data toward a payment provider or transaction
processing service. This is not a gross risk to privacy, since
often buyers and resellers are acquainted anyway, for instance
if superdistribution is based on personal recommendation. In
general, the identities of nodes in the RON should be protected
by Identity Management systems [46], [47] to the appropriate
level. The Paradiso system described in Section III-B exhibits
the usual trade-off between security and privacy. The chain
of licences transported downstream in the CDO contains
information (though not necessarily personalised) on every
superdistribution transaction on a path. It would be interesting
to see if security can be protected with similar strength but
with higher privacy levels. Methods for that can for instance
make use of cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs [48], [49].
Superdistribution as such is almost technology-neutral.
Three challenges need to be met for their success in the
economy of digital goods:
Market mechanisms must be implementable in a general
superdistribution framework or platform. Such a framework
should enable the definition of CDO and RON structures,
for instance rewarding levels, match-making rules, allowed
number of resales, or the more concrete rules some of which
have been mentioned in Section II-C.
A marketing platform must be incorporated in the superdis-
tribution network, in particular to ensure fairness in trade and
competition between resellers, and market homogeneity.
The dynamisation of the market should be supported. This
regards local changes in space and/or time of the two licences,
of which perhaps the most important example is dynamical
forward pricing. A related research challenge is to devise
methods to monitor the market in real time. This would for
instance be useful to furnish up-to-date information on the
popularity of a piece of content.
As an example, the digital good could be made returnable to
the originator or the reseller if the chances to achieve further
resales revenues becomes to low.
V. SOME REFLECTIONS ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION,
USER-GENERATED CONTENT, AND FREE RIDING
What is the relationship between superdistribution and
copyright protection? Most existing superdistribution systems
use copyright protection on the content, thus raising all well-
known questions of fair use. In those systems, superdistribu-
tion is just another marketing scheme for copyright-protected
content. One exception is the Potato system which deliberately
refrains from applying copyright protection on the content ans
therefore represents a true alternative to rigid DRM. As was
shown theoretically in previous work, DRM-free superdistri-
bution can in fact be economically viable even in the presence
of free riders due to the incentives provided to legitimate
resellers in the network marketing scheme implemented via
the remuneration overlay, cf. Section IV-B. Thus, the data
that needs the strongest protection in superdistribution is the
redistribution licence, not the consumption licence nor the
content itself, as we found out in Section IV-C.
Nevertheless, technical copyright protection is the prevalent
method used in the marketing of digital goods, and centralised
distribution is dominant. So it is interesting to reflect on the
ongoing “battle” between copyright holders and “pirates” to
see what role superdistribution of digital content may play in
the future. So, free-riders are fought by technical methods for
copyright protection and accompanying legal regulation [50]–
[52], which, generally speaking, aim at restoring features of
private, physical goods. None of this has lead to sustainable
success and economic, legal, and societal implications of
rigid DRM raised a heated debate about its various fun-
damental, economic, and pragmatic problems [8], cf. [53]
for a more general discussion of the underlying concepts of
intellectual property rights. The general legitimacy of DRM
measures which tend to disrupt consumers’ expectations on
their individual usage of the good [54], is doubtful in light
of empirical findings on the effect of illegal file-sharing on
record sales [55], which seems negligible.
Some industry players “defect from the front”, for instance
iTunes now offers media from major label EMI with superior
quality and free of copy protection, using the absence of
DRM as a means of quality discrimination [56]. Exponents
of the computer and media industries issued statements raising
doubts on the viability of DRM for media marketing [57], [58].
On the other hand recent court cases had a mixed outcome
for both sides, sometimes awarding (punitive) damages to
copyright holders, sometimes questioning the legitimacy of the
case as such. Nevertheless the legal lever of copyright holders
is becoming unprecedentedly long. In an unfortunate turn of
affairs of historic dimension this is associated with novel
legislation on lawful interception and mandatory data retention
in telecommunication meant to protect societies from serious
organised crime and terrorism. The pressure of the industries’
lobbyists is now on ISPs to filter copyrighted content and
block users even on the mere suspicion of infringement. This
approach has failed in the first attempt to push it through at
the European Parliament’s cultural commission [59], and the
Commissioner for the Internal Market has rejected the imple-
mentation of EU policies in that direction [60]. Nonetheless,
France has enacted legislation to bar users from the Internet
as penalty for copyright violations [61]. The demands go so
far as to “outlaw” and completely filter p2p protocols [62], as
they are mostly used for “piracy”2.
As Lawrence Lessig states in his insightful talk [63], “there
is growing extremism that comes from both sides in this debate
[. . . ]”. On the one side, a abolitionist attitude toward new
technology which for instance automatically removes copy-
righted content from sites like YouTube, regardless whether
there might be a claim of fair use to it or not. On the other
side a growing disrespect among the youth for the concept of
intellectual property as such, and even for the law in general.
User-generated content relying on original content, such as
“remixes” found frequently on the Web are a good example of
new forms of creativity that may be thwarted in such a hostile
environment. The implications go beyond digital goods and
could impact the whole way the Internet is used, as every
move in it by a law-abiding citizen or his children bears
incalculable risk of being incriminated. In such a situation
there is in fact little reason for copyright holders to experiment
with alternatives to centralised content distribution protected
by DRM, civil, and penal law. Culture would be “read-only” as
Lessig phrases it. Making the historical analogy to the advent
of broadcasting technology in the US in the 1930s, Lessig
describes how the then ruling cartel ASCAP that controlled
most of the performance rights nearly strangled the new media
by charging broadcasters inflationary prices. This worked until
in 1939 Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI) was founded.
BMI was a content aggregator organised much more democrat-
2With this rationale, SMTP should be outlawed, as the overwhelming
proportion of e-mail is SPAM.
ically and providing its subscribers for instance with bundles
of musical works from the public domain at economic prices.
In the early 1940s most broadcasters switched to BMI. ASCAP
countered with content quality arguments that are resounding
in the current DRM debate as well. Nevertheless ASCAP
cracked in 1941 and the bottom line is that competition alone
was enough to break a legal cartel over access to content.
Thus emerges the strongest argument against the advent of the
read-only culture. There can be an economic balance between
copyright holders and consumers and it can be struck by
the counterweight represented by community-produced, user-
generated content such as remixes and mashups.
In view of all this and with hindsight to history, superdistri-
bution and particularly network markets for digital goods could
be a part of the economic counterweight necessary to strike the
mentioned balance. As the Web is evolving now to the Web 2.0
where user-generated content and communities gain an in-
creasing importance, two germ ideas could be followed that
might raise the economic impact of superdistribution. First,
an open superdistribution platform can be envisaged on which
everyone can set up his own market mechanism for his own
content. Second, in a given superdistribution system, resellers
could be explicitly allowed and even encouraged to create
derivative works of the original content they superdistribute to
become value-added resellers. Both ideas enable resellers in a
CDN to differentiate themselves from each other. This helps
to provide an equal opportunity market for all participants and
make it more homogeneous.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main claim of the present paper is that superdistribution
is conceptually different from both DRM and p2p and is really
a third field in its own right. In fact we have shown that the
system theoretic content of superdistribution is much richer
than that of DRM systems, as it uses for the first time —
and by necessity — informational representations for the value
proposition of a digital good to its buyers, i.e., the combination
of consumption and remuneration for resales. Moreover the
economy of superdistribution lies on a categorically different
level than the economy of p2p networks, which is centred on
questions of incentives for participation and fairness in the
contribution of resources [64], rather than transported values.
We conclude that the evolution of superdistribution based
business models for digital goods is still in its early beginnings
— and though the risks are considerable, the prospects are
equally thrilling. As a research subject, superdistribution can
be really attractive since it is interdisciplinary by nature and
at the same time has a clearly defined field of experiment in
the digital economy.
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